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Mark G. Yudof *
I. INTRODUCTION
ACADEMIC REPUTATIONS ARE enhanced in different ways.
The quickest route to scholarly recognition may well lie in ad-
vancing universal theories that seek to explain and simplify complex
phenomena. If Occam's razor produces insights that are innova-
tive, albeit counterintuitive, this may suffice--even if, upon later re-
flection, the theory turns out to be dead wrong. Others attach
themselves to arresting metaphors, sometimes with quite spectacu-
lar results. Inevitably, the universal theories and metaphors are
tested and criticized by others. A theory may require so many re-
finements that it yields to a new paradigm. A metaphor may be
abandoned if it distorts more than it reveals, and more powerful
metaphors may take its place. Some scholars may abandon the
quest for the universal, reveling in the disorder and subjectivity of
human experience, deconstructing cherished truths. But a few great
scholars in each generation are universalists in their vision and
breadth of knowledge, yet eclectic in spirit. They employ meta-
phors but are not their captives. They are systematizers who also
attend to complexity and nuance, yet skeptics who perceive the
value of integrative thought. Professor Thomas I. Emerson is one of
these extraordinary scholars.
The richness of Professor Emerson's work is amply demon-
strated by his landmark book, The System of Freedom of Expres-
sion,1 published in 1970 and representing the culmination of his
career-long study of the first amendment.2 This magnum opus de-
fies simple description. As a theoretical work it draws on different
* Dean and James A. Elkins Centennial Chair in Law, The University of Texas School
of Law; B.A. (1965); LL.B. (1968) University of Pennsylvania. I wish to thank David An-
derson, Alan Boyle, Douglas Laycock, and Scot Powe for their helpful comments.
1. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970) [hereinafter FREE-
DOM OF EXPRESSION].
2. U.S. CONT. amend. I provides in part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech .... "
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theories of free speech, yet embraces no single, overarching vision of
the subject. Emerson focuses on freedom of expression as a means
of self-fulfillment, as a process for advancing knowledge and discov-
ering truth, as an essential element to democratic participation, and
as a framework for resolving conflict and promoting tolerance. His
distinct contribution is his ability to organize and to state coher-
ently the different values underlying freedom of expression.
Emerson's treatment of free speech is practical. Whether one's
concern is qualifications for public employment, national security,
legislative investigations, or defamation, Professor Emerson de-
scribes, examines, and synthesizes the law in ways that make it in-
telligible for those of us who are less perceptive. For the positivist,
answers to specific legal questions abound in his scholarship. But
his unique contribution lies in his ability to relate those practical
concerns to a broader vision. Professor Emerson insists that we
view speech systemically. The impact of rules and judicial decisions
should be determined in relation to their effect on the system of
freedom of expression,4 not only the impact on those proximate to
the dispute. Thus, whether a reader is writing a brief for a pending
case or an abstract essay in jurisprudence, The System of Freedom
of Expression 5 is equally indispensable.
A decade ago, as I began my research on the place of govern-
ment expression in the system of freedom of expression,6 I congrat-
ulated myself on the tabula rasa that I faced. I was struck (and
inspired) by the extent to which the "laissez faire perspective,"7 the
concern for self-fulfillment and individual autonomy,8 and the mar-
ketplace of ideas metaphor had come to dominate thinking about
freedom of expression.9 Individuals and private groups sent
3. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 1, at 6-7.
4. Id. at 17.
5. Id.
6. See generally M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983) [hereinafter WHEN
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS] (for comprehensive analyses of government expression).
7. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 1, at 697.
8. See, e.g., L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986); F. SCHAUER, FREE
SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom
of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 591 (1982); Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, I PHIL. & PUB. Ai'v. 204
(1972).
9. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[Tlhe ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market
..... ); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Every idea is
incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief
outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth."); see also WHEN
[Vol. 38:671
PERSONAL SPEECH AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION
messages to each other and to the government, but the dominant
theories, including the alluring self-governing speech model of Al-
exander Meiklejohn,'0 included little recognition of the fact that
modern governments are powerful communicators, that they have
the capacity to influence the citizenry as much as the citizenry may
influence them."I It was as if the baseball umpire was entitled to his
own turn at bat, and yet the other players decided it was best to
blink at that reality. Further, the emphasis on the individual
speaker's well-being and autonomy did not appear to tell us very
much about speech generated by modem complex organizations.
In a confident mood, I then turned to Professor Emerson's
work, anticipating (hoping?) that he too would ignore the subject of
my research. But, alas, I should have realized that he was serious
about examining the "system" of freedom of expression, not just in
regurgitating rules and court cases. In The System of Freedom of
Expression, Emerson devotes an entire chapter to the subject of gov-
ernment participation in communications activities. 2 The slate was
no longer so clean. With his typical acumen, Professor Emerson
noted that, "though government participation in a system of free-
dom of expression is of great and growing significance ... [, n]o
comprehensive effort to appraise the government role or to formu-
late principles of control has been undertaken."' 3 He then pro-
ceeded to cure that deficiency, providing the rich topsoil in which
his successors would attempt to grow more elaborate theories of
government expression in a democratic order. For a neophyte in
the field of freedom of expression, it was a painful lesson but one, I
trust, that enriched my own research and that of others.1 4
For Professor Emerson government speech is not a coda to a
first amendment symphony, for first and foremost, he insists that
any speech problem, no matter how novel, be viewed in terms of the
entire system of freedom of expression. After an introductory chap-
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS, supra note 6, at 18 & n.53 (discussion of "the metaphor of the mar-
ketplace of ideas").
10. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1965) [hereinafter POLITICAL FREEDOM].
11. WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS, supra note 6, at xv-xvi.
12. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 1, at 697-716.
13. Id. at 698 (footnote omitted).
14. See, eg., Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism: The Constitutionality of "Bending"
History in the Public Secondary Schools, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 497 (1987) [hereinafter In the
Name of Patriotism]; Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment
Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104 (1979) [hereinafter The First Amendment's Implied Political
Establishment Clause]; Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980); van Geel,
The Searchfor Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX.
L. REV. 197 (1983).
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ter articulating the many values underlying free speech,' he turns
immediately to a consideration of "freedom of belief." 16 While be-
lief is not expression, "it is the first stage in the process of expres-
sion, and it tends to progress into expression .... Hence ... the
right to form and hold beliefs is [prior to and] essential in maintain-
ing a system of expression." 17 Further, the coercion of belief "is the
hallmark of a feudal or totalitarian society." 18 A democratic soci-
ety must nurture a freedom of the mind or it can no longer claim to
be democratic.
At this point it would be easy for Professor Emerson to jump
into the mire of cases on religious belief,19 compulsory expression of
beliefs,20 loyalty oaths, 21 and student expression22-as he does later
in the chapter. But first he feels compelled to analyze the systemic
implications of the linkage between belief and expression. If one is
genuinely concerned about freedom of the mind, the scope of the
inquiry cannot be limited to government censorship of speech or
even government punishment for the holding of particular beliefs.
What of "the power of the government to influence belief through
education, propaganda, or other methods of persuasion"? 23 While
reserving a more ample treatment of the subject for a later chap-
ter,24 Professor Emerson is puzzled and sees no simple solution:
It is true that the line between persuasion and coercion may not
always be easy to trace. But the distinction is fundamental. By
its very nature a system of free expression involves-in fact is
designed to achieve-persuasion. The government is entitled to
participate in this system. But the introduction of coercion de-
stroys the system as a free one. The same is true of belief.25
There is no prohibition on government attempts to foster beliefs
through persuasion-there is no generalized restriction on govern-
15. FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION, supra note 1, at 3-20.
16. Id. at 21-41.
17. Id. at 21.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Jehovah's Witness convicted
under state statute for incitement. Court held the statute offended the first amendment).
20. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (Board's
resolution requiring students to salute the American flag violated the first amendment).
21. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (employer-mandated loyalty oath
constitutionally invalid).
22. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(suspension of public school students for wearing black armbands in protest against the Viet-
nam War violated the first and fourteenth amendments).
23. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 1, at 22.
24. Id. at 697-716.
25. Id. at 22.
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ment communications activities akin to the prohibition of an estab-
lishment of religion.26 Government speech in its efforts to educate,
to inform, and to reinforce communal bonds is not only legitimate,
but also essential to the system of freedom of expression.27 It also is
essential to the governing process, whether in a democratic or total-
itarian nation.28 But government expression is not entirely benign.
Government voices, reinforced by the broad powers and ample re-
sources of the modern state, may be used in the service of coercing
belief.29 There can be no democracy or freedom of speech without
"sel-controlled citizens," citizens free to form, articulate and act
upon their beliefs in the majoritarian processes of government.3 °
By chapter nineteen, Professor Emerson, unlike nearly all of his
predecessors, turns to the terra incognita of how government ex-
pression ought to be treated under the first amendment and within
the framework of the system of free expression.3' As always, his
answers are insightful, balanced, and thought-provoking. Emer-
son's primary concern is that government has become such a pow-
erful communicator in the modern world, employing new
technologies that the framers could not possibly have imagined,
26. U.S. CONsT. amend. I provides in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion .... "
27. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 1, at 22; see also WHEN GOVERNMENT
SPEAKS, supra note 6, at 41:
It is absurd... to adopt the position that government speech... is an illegitimate
enterprise in a liberal democratic state. To do so would strip government of a pri-
mary means of protecting and enhancing democratic values; of improving its leader-
ship capacity; of enforcing its public policies; and ... of securing its ability to
survive.
Id.; J. TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 11-15 (1977) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT
AND THE MIND] (the public community may legitimately act through government expression
to create knowledge and transmit ideas among community members).
28. WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS, supra note 6, at 20-22 (both democratic and totali-
tarian political systems require a communications network between the government and the
governed to achieve stability).
29. See id. at 42 ("The power to teach, inform, and lead is also the power to indoctri-
nate, distort judgment, and perpetuate the current regime.").
30. Id. at 32 ("[T]he ultimate goal in perfecting the two-way communication process
between government and the people is the production of an effective selector-the 'self-con-
trolled citizen.' ") (quoting D. BooRsrsN, DEMOCRACY AND ITS DiscoNTENTs 8-10 0974)
(in a society where citizens are surrounded by a constant flow of messages, "self-controlled
citizens" must exercise selective communication skills to maintain a democratic society)); see
also POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 10 (citizens must vigorously utilize the constitutional
rights of the electorate to insure that their representative government is a mechanism of free-
dom) (1965); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971) (The judiciary must apply neutral principles derived from the Constitution when it
acts to restrict the exertion of majoritarian power. Society only consents to be ruled un-
democratically within this defined area).
31. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 1, at 697-716.
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that there is a danger that the government's voice will overpower
other voices:
At some times or in some areas ... the functions or powers of
government may give it a monopoly or near monopoly over ex-
pression and other voices are closed off. This state of affairs is
obviously the antithesis of a system of free expression. The con-
trol of government expression in such a situation presents partic-
ular difficulties.32
Balancing this danger against "the initial proposition that the gov-
ernment has a broad right to engage in expression as part of its
regular functions,, 33 Emerson suggests a constitutional limitation
on government expression that, in my judgment, has been embraced
by the United States Supreme Court34-- though without citation to
his much earlier work:
The government's right of expression does not extend to any
sphere that is outside the governmental function. This might not
seem to be much of a limitation; the governmental function cer-
tainly covers an extensive area. Nevertheless the principle does
impose some limits. Thus the government would not be empow-
ered to engage in expression in direct support of a particular can-
didate for office. It is not the function of the government to get
itself reelected. Government expression must therefore operate
within these general boundaries. '
Professor Emerson then notes that a government-enforced monop-
oly, particularly in relation to a "captive audience," poses the great-
est threat to the system of freedom of belief and expression.36
In this essay, I would like to consider two themes closely related
to Professor Emerson's treatment of government expression, both of
which focus on public education. These problems arise because, in
the last analysis, governments can speak only through individuals,
those charged with conveying official policy, carrying on the educa-
tional process, and providing information. First, how should the
courts distinguish between expression by the government and per-
sonal speech by individuals involved in a governmental activity? As
Emerson notes, "the government can restrict its own expression, or
that of its agents (aside from their own private expression), without
32. Id. at 698.
33. Id. at 699.
34. See infra part III.
35. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 1, at 699.
36. Id. at 698, 710, 713 (A system in which the government can monopolize the means
of communication and force its messages on a captive audience is "the antithesis of a system
of free expression.").
[Vol. 38:671
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invading any First Amendment right.",3 7  When does this occur?
For example, what rights do student editors have to determine the
content of school-sponsored newspapers?"
Second, since government speaks in public schools through its
curricular choices, library book selection policies, textbooks, and
teachers, what constitutional constraints, if any, ought to be placed
on government decisions in these areas? When does government
education and persuasion become, to use perjorative words, uncon-
stitutional government indoctrination and coercion? In this regard,
recall that Emerson suggests that government expression ought to
be in the service of legitimate governmental functions, not in the
service of its own perpetuation of power.39 How may courts distin-
guish between the two?
II. GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION AND PERSONAL SPEECH
Though many are oblivious to government expression because it
is easy to overlook the obvious, the source of the speech generally is
37. Id. at 708-09.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 50-91.
39. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 1, at 699. Professor Emerson also suggests
that with respect to public education, where the government has "a near monopoly," courts
should require "the government to present, or allow presentation of, all viewpoints held to be
responsible in the scholarly or scientific community to which they are relevant." Id. at 715;
see also Emerson & Haber, The Scopes Case in Modern Dress, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 522, 527
(1960) (in the public school system "the obligation of the government must be to present a
fairly balanced exposition of various relevant theories and points of view").
I profoundly disagree with the application of principles of balanced presentation or fair-
ness, presumably derived from governmental regulation of the broadcast media, to public
schools. In my judgment this standard is inconsistent with the values underlying the first
amendment, impractical, and destructive of the educational process. FREEDOM OF EXPREs-
SION, supra note 1, at 714-16; see WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS, supra note 6, at 292-98. I
will not rehearse these arguments in this Article. A number of commentators, however, echo
Emerson's position; eg., In the Name of Patriotism, supra note 14 (argues that high school
history texts should be subject to a fairness test similar to that in broadcasting, which requires
a balanced presentation of ideas, so as to protect the captive student audience from indoctri-
nation and expose them to diverse viewpoints); The First Amendment's Implied Political Es-
tablishment Clause, supra note 14 (the judiciary should read the first amendment to contain a
prohibition against political establishment of ideas through governmental expression similar
to the prohibition against establishment of religion. Therefore, there should be a policy in
public schools requiring a balanced treatment of controversial issues). But see, e.g., Buckel v.
Prentice, 572 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1978) (court held that a public school's dissemination of
materials for students to take home to their parents, which were characterized as part of the
school's educational function, did not create a public forum in which appellant was entitled
to equal access for the dissemination of his own views); Yudof, Library Book Selection and
the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527, 527-37 (1984)
[hereinafter Library Book Selection] (argues that treating schools as public forums and thus
preventing administrators from exercising their selective functions is incompatible with the
goal of education, which is to properly assimilate autonomous individuals into society).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
not difficult to discern. The Internal Revenue Service tells us to file
our tax forms on time, a legislative committee issues a report on the
financing of higher education, or a state human rights commission
condemns hiring policies that it views as discriminatory. When the
sign on the highway states that fifty-five miles per hour is the maxi-
mum speed for automobiles, we strongly suspect that this is not the
private opinion of the sign manufacturer. Similarly, the Code of
Federal Regulations is not a public forum for all those with opin-
ions on regulatory matters. An effective government must commu-
nicate, provide information, publicize its rules, educate, persuade
and amass public support for policies.' These functions are as le-
gitimate as providing a national defense, regulating building con-
struction practices, providing access to medical care and social
security, or delivering the mail. If there is a hallmark of modern
governments, apart from their bureaucratic structure, it is their ex-
traordinary reliance on communication as an instrument of
policy.41
But sometimes there is ambiguity. We all have heard the obliga-
tory and traditional litany on radio and television channels that the
views expressed over the air waves are not necessarily those of the
advertisers or the management of the station. We may wonder if
the positions taken on "All Things Considered" on public radio are
those of the government or only those of the journalists and those
they interview. Taxpayers may blanch at the proposition that their
dollars are used to foster "propaganda," the inevitable characteriza-
tion of views with which one disagrees.42
If a police chief, in an unguarded moment, describes someone as
a crook and a scoundrel, are these his views or those of the police
department?43 The characterization of the speech may matter, for
if the statement is defamatory, the government's expression may be
40. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
41. See generally GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND, supra note 27, at 19-23 (government
has a role in shaping awareness across the entire range of public policy issues with which it
deals); WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS, supra note 6, at 5-6 (the widening role of government
in the lives of its citizens and advances in media technology have greatly expanded the gov-
ernment's opportunity to use communication with its citizens as a "policy tool").
42. See generally Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional In-
terests in Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 3, 3 (1983) ("Americans often
have money extracted from them and used to promote objects which they ideologically op-
pose. The most obvious example is the taxpayer.").
43. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (although the plaintiff may have a state tort
claim against police chief who made defamatory statements, plaintiff cannot sustain a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim because police chief's remarks did not deprive plaintiff of a constitu-
tional right).
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protected by sovereign immunity or another special privilege." On
the other hand, if the speech is "stigmatizing" and emanates from
the government, the injured individual may have a right under the
due process clause to a name-clearing hearing.45 Government ex-
pression, under some circumstances, can ruin a career as effectively
as a deprivation of property or prosecution.46
Reconsider Professor Emerson's observation that "[ilt is not the
function of the government to get itself reelected."'47 Taxpayers do
not expect the federal government to pay for the President's cam-
paign trips or for members of Congress to use the franking privilege
in their reelection efforts, though it may be difficult to disentangle
the political speech of individuals from governmental speech that
invariably puts the speaker in a favorable light. At some point, al-
beit difficult to define, the use of government dollars and resources
for private election purposes may be a violation of criminal law.48
Characterization of speech as governmental or personal also
may be critical to the provision of rights within the system of free-
dom of expression. In my judgment it is not coherent or correct to
argue that governments have rights of expression--only private in-
dividuals or groups have such rights against government interfer-
ence or censorship. 49 Since governments must employ the services
of individuals in promulgating their messages, it follows that the
participants in the government communications enterprise do not
necessarily have a right to substitute their personal views for those
of the government. Doubtless, all would be surprised to learn that
former speechwriter Patrick Buchanan's constitutional rights had
been violated if President Reagan omitted from his State of the
Union Address a passage on Nicaragua that Mr. Buchanan had
penned. So too, a typesetter in the Government Printing Office
44. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40 0950) (English common law
doctrine that the "Crown [was] immune [to] any suit to which it ha[d] not consented" was
adopted by United States courts on behalf of sovereign governments); Barr v. Matteo, 360
U.S. 564, 575 (1959) (federal agency director, issuing a press release in conjunction with the
suspension of the plaintiff, was acting in the "line of duty" and immune to libel suit).
45. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (plaintiff may sustain an
action against city officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because failure to hold a name-clearing
hearing after discharge was a violation of the plaintiff's right to due process).
46. WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS, supra note 6, at 263-80.
47. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 1, at 699.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1719 (1948); 39 U.S.C. § 3210(a)(5)(c) (1978). See also WHEN Gov-
ERNMENT SPEAKS, supra note 6, at 8-9.
49. Id. at 42-50. See Anderson v. City of Boston, 376 Mass. 178, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978),
appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979) (holding that the first amendment did not invalidate
state legislation which prohibited municipalities from expending government funds to influ-
ence the result of a state referendum ballot).
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would not normally be thought to have a right of free speech to
insert an essay on Keynesian economics in a pamphlet warning the
public against the dangers of AIDS.
The question of whether the government or individuals are
speaking recently came before the Supreme Court in the complex
and fascinating context of a school newspaper in Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier.5" The Hazelwood East High School spon-
sored Spectrum, a newspaper published approximately every three
weeks, and 4,500 copies of each issue were distributed to students,
faculty, and others.5" Most of the costs associated with the enter-
prise were borne by the school district, though revenues from the
sale of the newspaper defrayed a portion of the expense. Spectrum
was written and edited by students in the Journalism II class at
Hazelwood East, but the page proofs for each issue were routinely
submitted to the principal for his review and approval prior to pub-
lication.52 The dispute arose when the principal objected to two
articles written by students and eliminated the two pages on which
they appeared. One of the articles focused on the stories of three
pregnant students, and the other dealt with a student's reactions to
her parents' divorce.53
Suit was brought by three staff members of the newspaper, alleg-
ing that the deletions ordered by the principal violated their first
amendment right of freedom of expression. 4 The district court
ruled against the students, holding that school officials may impose
restraints on student editors where the school-sponsored newspaper
is "an integral part of the school's educational function."55 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,56 holding that the news-
paper was a public forum, and, as such, school officials were pre-
50. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).




55. 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1466 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (quoting Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp.
1043, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)); see also Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 863 (9th
Cir. 1982) (although students have a constitutional right to freedom of speech, it is not an
"unfettered constitutional right to be free from pre-publication review .... [Rather], the
special characteristics of the high school environment ... call for supervision and review by
school faculty and administrators."). See generally M. YUDOF, D. KIRP, T. VAN GEEL & B.
LEVIN, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 260-63 (rev. 2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter EDUCA-
TIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW] (Government may choose whether certain instruments of
communication will become a "public forum," and the promulgation of a government point
of view does not require that the publication be open to competing viewpoints, be fair or be
balanced).
56. 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986).
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cluded "from censoring its contents except when '"necessary to
avoid material and substantial interference with school work or dis-
cipline... or the rights of others." ' " By a five-to-three vote, the
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. 58
Before assessing the constitutionality of the principal's decision
to delete the articles, it is critical to determine whether Spectrum
should be viewed as government expression or as student speech
subsidized by the government. This is no trivial distinction. If
Spectrum is a government publication, then the editorial control of
the principal may appropriately be analogized to the power of a
private newspaper publisher or editor to determine the content of
the newspaper. Then the principal's actions are no different than a
decision by Katherine Graham to delete a journalist's article from
the front page of the The Washington Post. While the government
may have no constitutional authority to tell Mrs. Graham what sto-
ries to run in her newspaper, the journalists who work for her also
have no such prerogative. This analogy is compelling unless one
takes the view that the government is constitutionally disabled from
acting as a publisher. To be sure, aspiring journalists may need to
learn a civics lesson about freedom of the press in America; but
presumably they also need to learn that their editors and publishers
have the ultimate authority to determine what will be printed in the
newspaper.
Needless to say, the Hazelwood School Board and its school of-
57. 108 S. Ct. at 567 (1988) (quoting Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d
1368, 1374 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)); see also Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir. 1973) (the
Constitution protects student expression, but "freedom of the press enjoyed by students is not
absolute or unfettered. Students, like all other citizens, are forbidden advocacy which 'is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.' ") (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)); Quarterman v.
Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 58 (4th Cir. 1971) ("[S]chool authorities may ... exercise prior restraint
upon publications distributed on school premises during school hours in those special circum-
stances where they can 'reasonably "forecast substantial disruption of or material interference
with school activities."' ... ) (quoting Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 806-07
(2d Cir. 1971)); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1970) ("[S]chool officials
have 'comprehensive authority' to prescribe and control conduct in the schools through rea-
sonable rules consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards."), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
826 (1970). See generally STANDARDS RELATING TO SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION 91-94
(1977) (discussion of the concept that school sponsored expression should have the same
rights and limitations as unsponsored expression, with some exceptions, such as not allowing
disparaging comments about particular racial groups); In the Name of Patriotism, supra note
14, at 517-19 (general discussion of education in America including critical analysis of the
tension between protecting free expression of students, promoting access for different views
and the role of school newspapers).
58. 108 S. Ct. at 572.
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ficials had not fully probed the constitutional dimensions of their
enterprise when they established Spectrum. Board policies and the
Hazelwood East Curriculum Guide contemplated a "laboratory sit-
uation" in which students were to apply the skills that they had
learned in Journalism I to the Journalism II course.59 All of the
staff members of Spectrum were members of the Journalism II class,
they received grades and academic credit for their work, and the
class was taught by a regular instructor. The instructor selected the
editors, scheduled publication dates, assigned stories, determined
the length of each issue, advised students on their stories, edited
stories and letters to the editor, and dealt with the printing com-
pany. In short, he had the final authority with regard to virtually
every aspect of the publication, subject to the principal's reservation
of the right to review Spectrum prior to the publication of each
* 60issue.
Justice White, writing for the majority, relied on this evidence to
conclude that "[s]chool officials did not evince either 'by policy or
by practice'. .. any intent to open the pages of Spectrum 'to indis-
criminate use' . . . by its student reporters and editors, or by the
student body generally.", 61 Although students wrote for Spectrum
and assisted in its publication, Spectrum was the school district's
own newspaper. In the Court's words, it was "a supervised learning
experience for journalism students [and s]chool officials were [thus]
entitled to regulate the contents of Spectrum in any reasonable
manner. '"62 If the articles were the personal expression of the stu-
dent editors, official censorship would be impermissible if the arti-
cles did not threaten a substantial interference with the school's
ability to accomplish its "educational mission. "63 But if Spectrum
were part of the curriculum itself, if the relevant legal question cen-
tered on the school district's ability to direct its own communica-
tions enterprise, then only minimal constitutional limitations
applied.
Conceptually, the Kuhimeier decision identifies two ways in
which students may disrupt the educational environment of a
school through their expressional activities. They may seek to
59. Id. at 568.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 569 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
47 (1983)). But see Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (students may not be
prohibited from expressing views on the Vietnam War in a school newspaper).
62. 108 S. Ct. at 569.
63. Id. at 567; see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
509, 514 (1969).
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counter or supplement the school's messages through their own
speech, or they may seek to exercise some control over the school's
words to dilute or change its message." In the former situation,
students have independent constitutional rights. They may decide
on what they wish to say and where they wish to say it, subject to
the caveat that they have no right to unduly hamper the school's
educational mission. Accordingly, they may wear black armbands
to protest military activities of the national government 65 or dis-
tribute their own newspapers; 66 yet they may not speak on human
rights in Nicaragua in the midst of a geometry class.
If the expression is governmental and not personal, students
generally may not interfere with the school's articulation of its own
educational messages. They do not have a constitutional right to
add or delete courses from the curriculum, alter the teacher's lesson
plan, or scrutinize the school district's choice of textbooks.67 Simi-
larly, they do not have final authority over the content of a school
newspaper. The primary constitutional limitation, as Professor
Emerson suggested and as I will develop below, is whether the
school district is carrying out its legitimate governmental functions
or is acting ultra vires.68
Once the personal/governmental speech distinction is appreci-
ated, reasonable persons may differ on whether Spectrum had been
established as a public forum for students. Board Policy 348.51
stated that "'[s]chool sponsored student publications will not re-
strict free expression or diverse viewpoints within the rules of re-
sponsible journalism,' "69 though it also stated that "'[such]
publications [were] developed within the adopted curriculum and
its educational implications.' "70 The majority felt that the provi-
64. See EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW, supra note 55, at 263-64 (discussing
"the degree to which student and teacher expression may permissibly interfere with the ac-
complishment of the school's educational objectives").
65. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
66. See, eg., Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (per curiam)
("[Mere dissemination of ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on a state university
campus may not be shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of decency.' "); Jacobs v. Board
of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601, 610 (7th Cir. 1973) ("[O]ccasional presence of earthy
words in the [school newspaper] can not be found likely to cause substantial disruption of
school activity .... "), vacated as moot, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam).
67. See Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 693 (11th Cir. 1987) (School
administrators have discretion to select school textbooks and presence of offensive material in
the books "is not sufficient to render use of this material in the public schools a violation of
the establishment clause.").
68. See infra text accompanying notes 120-28.
69. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 568-69 0988).
70. Id. at 568.
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sion was designed to give school authorities the final say over what
constituted " 'responsible journalism,'" while noting that students
would be given considerable latitude.71 So too, another policy
stated that " 'Spectrum, as a student-press publication, accepts all
rights implied by the First Amendment.' ",72 Justice White treats
this as a tautology: the students have the constitutional rights that
they have. He does not view the statement as intended to expand
the scope of first amendment rights for student editors of a school-
sponsored newspaper.73
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun,74 views Hazelwood's policies as creating a set of expec-
tations or promises that were violated by the school authorities.
But interestingly enough, Justice Brennan does not rely on these
policies for the proposition that the Spectrum was a public forum.
He does not expend much energy undermining the majority's con-
clusion that the Hazelwood School District, "'by policy or prac-
tice,' ,7' never intended to create a public forum. Rather, he
attacks the Court's "taxonomy of school censorship., 76 In his view,
precedent and logic do not support the "distinction between per-
sonal and school-sponsored speech."' 77 Justice Brennan perceives
that the majority's distinction rests on "an obscure tangle of three
excuses to afford educators 'greater control' over school-sponsored
speech ... ; the public educator's prerogative to control curriculum;
the pedagogical interest in shielding the high school audience from
objectionable viewpoints and sensitive topics; and the school's need
to dissociate itself from student expression, '78 enabling the Court to
avoid applying the Tinker disruption test.79
With due deference, Justice Brennan largely misses the thrust of
the majority opinion. The personal/governmental distinction rests
entirely on the proposition that the curriculum represents the gov-
71. Id. at 569.
72. Id.
73. Id. (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 573-80 (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
75. Id. at 568 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
47 (1983)).
76. Id. at 575.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 576.
79. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 0979)
("[W]here there is no finding.., that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of
the school,'" the state may not constitutionally prohibit student expression.) (quoting Burn-
side v. Byers, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
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ernment's own efforts at education and persuasion and that the con-
stitutional right of the students to speak does not extend to the
point of allowing them to reshape the state's own communications.
Once it is recognized that the school district is seeking to control its
own communications, rather than to censor the personal views of
the students, then the applicable rules change. School authorities
may take into account the age and maturity of the students in decid-
ing what articles are appropriate for a school newspaper like Spec-
trum. They may make editorial decisions based on the need to
discourage drug abuse or irresponsible sexual conduct, and they
may be concerned that certain student views may appear to carry
the imprimatur of the school district. Presumably, they may even
publish the newspaper in accordance with their own views of good
taste-just as Rupert Murdoch may do so for his newspapers.
These bases for editorial discretion are not the reasons for the dis-
tinction between personal and governmental speech. Rather, they
identify a permissible range of editorial judgments once it is deter-
mined that the school district is, in fact, the publisher and editor of
the newspaper.
In declining to force the issue as to whether the Hazelwood
School District had created a public forum, Justice Brennan enters
dangerous terrain. The question is no longer whether Spectrum has
been opened by school officials to all contributors, on an equal basis;
the question is one of control and authority. Who is running the
newspaper, the principal and instructor or the student editors? Pre-
sumably, a student editorial board would reject some articles, assign
some stories and not others, and develop policies for handling sensi-
tive material on sex, drugs, divorce, and other themes. The very
power that Justice Brennan would deny the principal will be exer-
cised by the students; there will be no public forum unless they
choose to create one. But what is the justification for Justice Bren-
nan's constitutionalization of the question of who is the publisher of
the newspaper?
One possible justification, which Justice Brennan does not ex-
pressly endorse, is that government is too dangerous a publisher and
editor: "[e]ven in its capacity as educator the State may not assume
an Orwellian 'guardianship of the public mind.' "8o Accordingly,
once the school district makes the decision to establish a school
80. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 577 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945)
(Jackson, J., concurring)); see also In the Name of Patriotism, supra note 14, at 523-24 (If
student newspapers are part of school administration, "the diffcult problem is to explain
whether that fact creates a restriction on the students or the schools.").
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newspaper, the first amendment would require it to delegate all con-
tent decisions to an autonomous group of student editors, and the
school district would be constitutionally disabled from exercising
continuing editorial authority over the newspaper.8 1 But such a po-
sition, apart from its uncertain constitutional derivation, is at odds
with the legitimate role of the government as a communicator in a
democracy. Indeed, the logic of this position is that government
should not be in the education business at all. There are Orwellian
possibilities in the fashioning of the curriculum, in the selection of
teachers, in the choice of textbooks and library books, and so on.
While there may be limits on government expression, it seems in-
conceivable that elected and appointed school authorities must turn
these decisions over to students (or other private individuals) as a
matter of constitutional doctrine.
A second possible justification for Brennan's analysis is that spe-
cial concerns are involved because the school authorities are speak-
ing through individual students. His dissent in Kuhimeier relies on
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,8" a case that involved a
lewd nominating speech by a student in the context of "a school-
sponsored educational program in self-government." 83 The Court
in Bethel upheld the school district's decision to discipline the stu-
dent for the speech, but relied on the special character of the speech
and on the disruptive impact of the speech, not on the fact that the
activity was school-sponsored.84
For Justice Brennan the problem is not the school sponsorship
of the activity at issue; it is the limitation on the student's personal
choice of his or her words in the school setting.8 Thus, for exam-
ple, when the school board chooses a curriculum, the curriculum
clearly is school-sponsored. But the students are not the vehicles
for the government's educational message; they are the listeners or
recipients of that message. The fact that the history of the Ameri-
can Revolution is taught, and not the history of twentieth century
revolutions in the Third World, does not implicate the student's
own expression. Stated differently, if two purposes of freedom of
expression are to advance personal autonomy and self-fulfillment,
81. See, e.g., Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973) (court reaffirmed
principles that "strike down every form of censorship of student publication at state-sup-
ported institutions"); see also Nowak, Using the Press Clause to Limit Government Speech, 30
ARIZ. L. REv. 1, 38-40 (1988).
82. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
83. Id. at 3162.
84. Id. at 3159.
85. Id. at 3167-68 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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the principal's actions in the Kuhlmeier case are antithetical to
these values.
I am not at all persuaded that, to use my example, the curricular
choices of the school authorities are less threatening to individual
autonomy or self-fulfillment than the editing and deletion of student
articles from a school newspaper.8 6 Curricular choices may make
autonomous choices less likely for those who do not know of other
realities. But more to the point, all government communication in-
volves individuals, and there is nothing unique about a school dis-
trict relying on student editors to publish a newspaper. Curriculum
choices would be meaningless if teachers were ,free to teach
whatever they thought appropriate; they may have a range of aca-
demic freedom but that freedom does not include the power to
choose course offerings.87 Even in the school library, the librarian
normally must implement the board's decisions, and certainly the
writers of the books do not have a constitutional right to determine
what books will be acquired. Or, to shift the focus from schools,
there could be no government advertising for the military or for the
prevention of forest fires if the government were compelled to dele-
gate editorial authority to advertising agencies.
Even Justice Brennan appears uncomfortable with the position
that he has taken. If the students, and not the school authorities,
must be in charge of Spectrum, on what basis can the school refuse
to publish articles that are " 'ungrammatical, poorly written, inade-
quately researched, biased or prejudiced,' or that fall[ ] short of the
'high standards for ... student speech that [are] disseminated under
[the school's] auspices ... ?' "88 Justice Brennan agrees with the
86. See generally S. ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN
SCHOOLING (1983) (comprehensive discussion of the problems of curriculum choices and the
forced inculcation of ideologies); In the Name of Patriotism, supra note 14 (because attend-
ance in public schools is compulsory and there is a captive audience, the text and materials
used to teach may result in indoctrination to particular viewpoints)); Comment, Challenging
Ideological Exclusion of Curricular Material: Rights of Students and Parents, 14 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 485 (1979) (author asserts that public schools do not possess an un-
restricted authority to exclude material from the curriculum).
87. See Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979) (Senior high school
teachers brought an action against school board for banning books in an elective language
course. Court held since school board was authorized to prescribe the curriculum, it also
could choose course texts). But see Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970)
(A public school teacher was dismissed for assigning a short story to eleventh grade students.
Court held that the teacher has a constitutional right to choose class material although aca-
demic freedom was not an enumerated right).
88. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 576 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting 108 S. Ct. 562, 570 (White, J.)).
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majority that school authorities constitutionally can act in this
manner:
But we need not abandon Tinker to reach that conclusion; we
need only apply it. The enumerated criteria reflect the skills that
the curricular newspaper "is designed to teach." The educator
may, under Tinker, constitutionally "censor" poor grammar,
writing, or research because to reward such expression would
"materially disrup[t]" the newspaper's curricular purpose.8 9
But this line of reasoning trivializes the educational function of
government. Correct spelling is not taught in public schools be-
cause incorrect spelling is disruptive; it is taught because the citi-
zenry and their elected and appointed representatives think that
well-educated youngsters should spell in accordance with accepted
standards. Standard spelling may be considered an Orwellian
plot-public schools may close the minds of future adults to the
entreaties of the advocates of poor spelling-yet education inevita-
bly involves socialization choices. Public school officials must make
value judgments as to what is educationally appropriate and use-
ful.90 Indeed, much depends on the identified curricular purpose.
If Justice Brennan were to admit that responsible sex and the avoid-
ance of drug abuse were legitimate "curricular purpose[s]," 91 then
articles expressing the contrary view in a school newspaper would
be disruptive of the school's educational mission.
If the Tinker disruption test92 is applied to government commu-
nication, the test becomes unintelligible. The disruption standard
was used in Tinker in the sense of allowing students to engage in
personal expression on school premises absent a significant interfer-
ence with the state's ability to transmit its own messages.93 Hence
there is no right to discuss foreign policy in the confines of a geome-
try class, but there may be such a right in the cafeteria or hallways.
The standard was not used to give students a constitutional prerog-
ative to rewrite lesson plans. Even teachers do not have such an
unbridled right. 4 Moreover, a student resistant to traditional ge-
ometry would not have a constitutional right to receive credit for
examination answers that were incorrect under the prevailing math-
89. Id. at 576 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 513 (1979)).
90. See Library Book Selection, supra note 39, at 528-33.
91. Kuhimeier, 108 S. Ct. at 576.
92. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503; see supra text accompanying note 78.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 116 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(the state may determine what subjects are to be included in the public school curriculum,
but are restricted in limiting what teachers may say).
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ematics orthodoxy. That the students are involved in the pedagogi-
cal enterprise, as they must be, does not signify that school officials
cannot require the student to speak or respond in particular ways.
The principle that there are constitutionally relevant distinc-
tions between government speech, or government-sponsored speech,
and personal speech is sound. Even Justice Brennan has recognized
the distinction on other occasions: although students are involved,
school-sponsored prayer violates the Establishment Clause, but in-
dividual prayer is constitutionally protected.95 Under Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters96 parents may establish a private school and, subject to
some state regulation, they may determine the curriculum of that
school.97 Thus, for example, parents may choose to emphasize reli-
gious values, rejecting what they perceive to be the dominant "secu-
lar humanism" in public schools. Yet, parents have no
constitutional right to inject their religious values into the public
school curriculum. 8
Even in the context of publications at public educational institu-
tions I am not certain that Justice Brennan fully appreciates the
implications of his dissent in Kuhlmeier. At the University of
Texas, where I teach and serve as Dean of the School of Law, the
University's News and Information Service publishes On Campus,
an informative and well-written, eight-page newspaper. In a recent
issue99 the cover picture was of the cast of La Cage aux Folles, a
musical to be performed at a university concert hall. The lead story
was on a Department of Energy grant to the university for "re-
search on robotic systems capable of performing tasks that are haz-
95. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (agreed that school-imposed Bible reading violated the establishment clause); see also
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school-imposed non-denominational prayer violates the
establishment clause); Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of
Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 9 (1986) [hereinafter Equal Status
of Religious Speech] ("Government speech in support of religion is forbidden even if it occurs
on private property; private speech in support of religion is protected even if it occurs on
public property.").
96. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See generally WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS, supra note 6, at
227-30 (analyzing impact of Pierce on public education).
97. 268 U.S. at 510.
98. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577 (1987) (The Court must be "partic-
ularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and
secondary schools."); Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684 (1 1th Cir. 1987)
(establishment clause imposes religious neutrality on public schools); cf. Mozert v. Hawkins
County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (first amendment right to free exercise of
religion is not offended by a public school's use of basic reader texts that are violative of some
parents' religious values).
99. On Campus, Jan. 25-31, 1988.
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ardous to humans."'' Inside there were stories on the fortieth
anniversary of the Graduate School of Library and Information Sci-
ence and on the opening of an art exhibit on campus. There also
was a column, Of Note, on faculty achievements, a report from the
Secretary of the University Council, a summary of a professor's re-
search on the decline of major television networks, and a calendar
of events for the week. On the last page of On Campus there is a
statement of editorial policy:
On Campus is a weekly publication for the faculty and staff of
The University of Texas at Austin. News content is selected on
the basis of campus-wide interest so as not to duplicate unneces-
sarily what appears in newsletters of individual colleges ... or
other units of the university. News of associations and organiza-
tions not formally a part of UT Austin will not be included. On
Campus will not publish editorials, letters to the editor or other
columns of opinion. Space will be made available for messages
from the president and for reports by an officer of the Faculty
Senate, the General Faculty, the University Council and the
Graduate Assembly.'01
To state the obvious, On Campus is not a public forum, open to
all would-be contributors, and it makes no pretense of covering the
full range of newsworthy events across the nation and around the
world. As one journalist put it, it is a "kept" newspaper. It does
not publish the opinions of individuals except in their official capac-
ities at the university. Doubtless, it would not surprise anyone to
learn that On Campus does not invite controversy; it generally is
full of good news on faculty, students, and staff, and it is not known
for its muckraking investigations of the Board of Regents or its crit-
icisms of university administrators. That role is left to the student
newspaper, The Daily Texan, where content decisions primarily are
made by a student editor elected by the students and business deci-
sions are made by an autonomous board. The Board of Regents has
chosen to delegate authority over The Daily Texan to others, and it
abides by that delegation no matter how trying the consequences.
In my judgment, On Campus is not an unconstitutional activity
on the part of the state of Texas. It serves to express the views of
the university and its officers, provide information to the university
community, and promote its educational mission-perfectly legiti-
mate governmental functions. The university is not constitutionally
required to establish a public forum or to delegate decision-making
authority to individual editors. If the university were to dismiss an
100. Id. at 1.
101. Id. at 8.
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employee of the News and Information Service for using four-letter
words in an article or for running a piece critical of the president,
her first amendment rights would not be violated. It is not a ques-
tion of her prose "disrupting" the educational process, rather her
right of free expression does not encompass the substitution of her
words and ideas for those of university officials. Conversely, having
delegated editorial responsibility to the student editors of The Daily
Texan, that delegation should be honored. The ad hoc withdrawal
of editorial authority, in response to a disagreement over the con-
tent of particular articles, raises substantial constitutional
concerns. 1
02
In terms of Kuhimeier, the Court's attitude toward the actions
of high school officials properly should turn on its characterization
of the speech in Spectrum. One article deleted by the principal fo-
cused on the experiences of three pregnant Hazelwood East stu-
dents. Though false names were used, the principal feared that the
students could be identified from the article."0 3 He also thought
that the references to sexual activity and birth control were inappro-
priate for younger readers, although there were no graphic descrip-
tions of sexual activity."° The other deleted article concerned a
student's account of her father's behavior prior to the divorce of her
parents. The principal believed that the father should have been
given the opportunity to respond to the accusations or to consent to
the story. ' 05
If Spectrum is viewed as an integral part of the curriculum,
more similiar to On Campus than The Daily Texan, these are the
types of judgments typically made by editors, publishers, and teach-
ers. It is not "censorship" in the classic sense, rather those who
own and operate a newspaper often must make judgment calls
about the fairness of articles, the tastefulness of the presentations
for the audience, and the interests of individuals in their privacy. In
a sense, it is no different than the decisions that editors and publish-
ers in the private sector must make about whether to reveal that a
presidential candidate has an alcoholism problem or has engaged in
premarital sex. They also must decide whether to print the story
without giving the candidate an opportunity to respond to damag-
ing allegations. Similarly, if the school district is the editor, then it
should be allowed to edit.
102. See Library Book Selection, supra note 39, at 553-59.
103. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 571 (1988).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 572.
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If public officials have delegated all responsibility over the con-
tent of a school-sponsored publication or if a privately published
student newspaper is the focus of the litigation, then other first
amendment concerns arise. The students are accountable for their
personal speech, 10 6 and the Tinker disruption test should be ap-
plied. 107 In the absence of a reasonable forecast of substantial dis-
ruption of the educational process, the unfairness of the article to
the divorced father and the intrusion on the privacy of the pregnant
students are matters to be settled between the student editors and
the affected individuals.
III. LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION
At this point in the analysis, the question often arises as to
whether there are any limitations on government expression. Is
there any difference between the state or school district as publisher
and editor and The New York Times and its publishers and editors?
What if the principal had insisted that Spectrum endorse particular
candidates for the Hazelwood School Board? What if it ran articles
taking the position that racial discrimination ought to be practiced?
This is a murky area, and one to which I have devoted considerable
attention elsewhere,"'8 but let me identify the approach that the
Supreme Court recently has taken to cabining government
expression.
Justice White's majority opinion in Kuhlmeier is not very clear
on the question of what are the constitutional limits on government
expression, once it is determined that Spectrum speaks for the
school and not the students.' 9 He intimates "that educators do not
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the
style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns."11 He then elaborates on this theme:
106. See Sinn v. The Daily Nebraskan, 829 F.2d 662, 666 (8th Cir. 1987) (" 'Since there
is not the slightest whisper that the University authorities had anything to do with the rejec-
tion of this material offered by this off-campus cell of homosexuals... and since the record
suggests ... nothing but discretion exercised by an editor chosen by the student body .. ' ",
the students were solely accountable for the action taken. There was no state action and
plaintiffs could not bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against university newspaper.) (quoting
Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1075 (5th Cir. 1976).
107. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1979); see
supra text accompanying note 78.
108. See WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS, supra note 6, at 211-99.
109. Kuhimeier, 108 S. Ct. 562.
110. Id. at 571 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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It is only when the decision to censor a school-sponsored publi-
cation, theatrical production, or other vehicle of student expres-
sion has no valid educational purpose that the First Amendment
is so "directly and sharply implicate[d]," .... as to require judi-
cial intervention to protect students' constitutional rights."'
Subsequently, Justice White concluded that "we cannot reject as
unreasonable Principal Reynolds' conclusion that neither the preg-
nancy article nor the divorce article was suitable for publication in
Spectrum."" 2
Read most broadly, the language in Kuhlmeier may appear to
overturn the Court's decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District. 3 In Tinker the Court had endorsed the proposi-
tion that student speech in public schools is entitled to constitu-
tional protection if it did not lead "school authorities to forecast
substantial disruption of or material interference with school activi-
ties.""' 4 Justice Harlan argued in his dissent, however, that only a
good faith test should apply to school officials:
I would... cast upon those complaining [students] the burden of
showing that a particular school measure was motivated by other
than legitimate school concerns-for example, a desire to pro-
hibit the expression of an unpopular point of view, while permit-
ting expression of the dominant opinion. 15
If, however, the majority intented to adopt Harlan's dissent in
Kuhlmeier, why does it reaffirm Tinker with such clarity near the
beginning of its opinion?
Students in the public schools do not "shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate.". . . They cannot be punished merely for expressing
their personal views on the school premises-whether "in the
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the
authorized hours" . . . unless school authorities have reason to
believe that such expression will "substantially interfere with the
work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other
students." 11
6
The answer, I believe, lies in the fact that the Kuhlmeier "valid
educational purpose" test applies only to government expression in
the public schools.'" 7 The Tinker disruption test remains applicable
111. Id.
112. Id. at 572.
113. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
114. Id. at 514.
115. Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
116. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 567 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 509, 512-13 (1969).
117. Id. at 571.
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to the students' own expression.118 This reading of Kuhlmeier
makes sense of the case, and also comports with Justice Brennan's
interpretation of the majority's opinion.' 19
The doctrinal distinction drawn by the Court has much to com-
mend it in terms of protecting the system of freedom of expression.
The core idea is that the educational function of government is le-
gitimate, and government participation in communications and ed-
ucational activities is valuable to the system of freedom of
expression. As Professor Emerson noted nearly twenty years ago,
however, the government's expression must be linked to its proper
functions. If a school district is acting in reasonable pursuit of its
educational mission, courts should not interfere with its decisions
about what it chooses to communicate. On the other hand, per-
sonal speech by individuals is protected by the first amendment, and
such protection is a valuable systemic antidote to the risk of govern-
ment domination over the thinking processes of the citizenry.1 20
Phrased somewhat differently, students have individual rights of
expression against government censorship; these rights flow from
the panoply of values underlying the first amendment and are cir-
cumscribed only if their exercise would substantially impede the
government's proper functioning. If there is no such interference,
the avowed reasons for the censorship do not matter. Limitations
on government expression, however, inhere in the proper role of
government in a democracy; they flow from the considered judg-
ment that some forms of ultra vires governmental action are illegiti-
mate and threaten the system of freedom of expression. In
determining whether particular government communication activi-
ties are ultra vires, courts may interpret the government's reasons
for its actions, for the same speech may serve permissible or imper-
missible governmental objectives. 12
Viewed from this perspective, Kuhimeier comports with a
number of precedents placing limits on government expression in
public schools. In a world where resources and time are scarce, in
which all things that might be taught cannot be taught, in which all
books cannot be acquired, the reasons for specific curricular choices
(or other decisions) become critical. If it is virtually impossible to
measure the impact of government expression, that is, whether an
American history course crosses the line from the educational to the
118. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 514.
119. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. See WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS, supra note 6, at 200-07.
121. See id. at 301-06.
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establishment of a "pall of orthodoxy," '12 2 intentions may be the
best crude indicators of effects. Moreover, even the most noble
quest for education may result in the closing of minds to alternative
ideas. It may be extremely difficult to teach American culture in a
manner that both critics and defenders regard as fair; an emphasis
on cultural successes or failures may lead to very different socializa-
tion outcomes. If the state's role in education is not to be aban-
doned entirely, however, courts may tolerate the incidential
fostering of orthodoxy if the state's objectives are within its legiti-
mate powers.
Examples of the good faith educational standard abound in the
case law. There may be many reasons for requiring that creation-
ism be taught or that it be presented in conjunction with the teach-
ing of Darwinian theory. Choices among theories are made all the
time. But if the purpose or motive is to advance religious beliefs,
then a curricular choice is unconstitutional. 2 ' Similarly, prayer
may nurture many secular virtues, but the reason for compulsory
prayer in public schools is known to all. In both cases, there is a
clear benefit to religion from the activity, as well as an impermissi-
ble motive.
Laws requiring moments of silence in public schools also have
triggered a motivation analysis. To be sure, teachers often ask stu-
dents to be silent when they are lecturing or while other students
are reading or taking examinations. Indeed, silence may be golden
in its own right, but if a moment of silence is motivated by a desire
to promote religion, it is constitutionally impermissible-apparently
even if there is no benefit to religion.1
24
122. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870 (1982) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
123. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2582 (1987) (primary purpose of the
Louisiana Creationism Act was to advance a particular religious belief; as thus the Act vio-
lated the first amendment); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) ("IThe State may
not adopt programs or practices in its public schools or colleges which 'aid or oppose' any
religion."); McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1274 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
("No group, no matter how large or small, may use the organs of government, of which the
public schools are the most conspicuous and influential, to foist its religious beliefs on
others.").
124. Compare Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (Court found that the Alabama
Legislature enacted a period of silence in the public schools as the "[s]tate's endorsement of
prayer activities" and thus was not consistent with neutrality toward religion) with May v.
Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 253 (3rd Cir. 1985) (a period of silence in public school had no
"secular purpose" and therefore was invalid despite lack of benefit), appeal dismissed sub
noma. Karcher v. May, 108 S. Ct. 388 (1987). See generally Equal Status of Religious Speech,
supra note 95, at 57-66 (for a discussion of the role of motivation analysis in the promulgation
and application of moment-of-silence legislation).
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Even outside of the establishment of religion context, these ex-
amples of motivation analysis can be easily multiplied. If a school
district insists that teachers assign particular books, and its reasons
go to the educational appropriateness of particular readings, then
the teacher's right of academic freedom has not been violated. 2
Teachers have no right to fashion their own public school curricu-
lum. But if the school district is engaged in a "systemic effort ...
'to exclude [a] particular type of thinking or book,' 126 and if it is
determined to root out ideas with which it disagrees, academic free-
dom may provide the doctrinal handle to overturn the attempt to
foster orthodoxy.
Similarly, school libraries may acquire and remove books for all
sorts of reasons; the librarian may choose some books over others
simply because they are better, cheaper, or more intelligible to ninth
graders. 127 No school library can acquire every published book.
But the reasons for removing a book, previously acquired, are more
difficult to fathom. As Justice Brennan noted in Board of Education
v. Pico, if school authorities, by such removal actions, "intended...
to deny [students] access to ideas with which [they] disagreed, and
if this intent was the decisive factor in [the] decision, then [the
school authorities] have exercised their discretion in violation of the
Constitution. To permit such intentions to control official actions
would be to encourage [an] ... officially prescribed orthodoxy." '128
IV. CONCLUSION
The motivation test for government expression in public schools
and elsewhere has its troublesome side. Instinctively, many of us
are more concerned with what the government does than why it
does it. Yet there may be no choice but to examine purpose where
125. See Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 544 (10th Cir. 1979) (Teachers do not
have an unlimited right to designate structure and content. As long as no "systematic effort"
is made to exclude a particular approach or viewpoint, local decision-makers may exclude
certain books from the curriculum).
126. 598 F.2d at 544 (quoting parties' stipulation).
127. Compare Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir.
1980) ("[N]othing in the Constitution permits the courts to interfere with local educational
discretion until local authorities begin to substitute ... exclusive indoctrination for the mere
exercise of their perogative to make ... choices regarding matters of legitimate dispute.")
with Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976) ("In the
absence of any explanation of the Board's action which is neutral in First Amendment terms,
we must conclude that the School Board removed the books because it found them objection-
able in content.").
128. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)
(footnote omitted).
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the actions themselves are not contrary to constitutional values.
Further, motivation tests are notoriously slippery: governmental
bodies may act for conflicting reasons; individual decision-makers
may disagree on the rationale for a particular policy; the history of
the decision may be unclear; or officials may deliberately remain
silent or lie about their true intent. In many situations, only public
school officials will be able to determine accurately the constitution-
ality of their own decisions.' 2 9
At a deeper level, I am concerned about the coherence of the
good faith test, though I have no better theory to suggest for identi-
fying ultra vires government expression. What is the difference be-
tween genuine education and an illegitimate "pall of orthodoxy"? 3 '
Student editors of Spectrum have learned the necessity of respecting
the privacy rights of others. But is that not a normative judgment?
Are we not trying to close their minds to the entreaties of those who
value journalistic expression over individual privacy? If students
may not use vulgar words in a school-sponsored newspaper, what of
the pro-vulgarity point of view? Are we socializing them to linguis-
tic civility? How is this different from teaching students to prefer
Democrats over Republicans, or traditional views on gender roles
over feminist visions?
Every decision on the content of a school newspaper, every cur-
ricular choice, and every book selection policy involves socialization
to particular norms and values. Judges may be naivet6 to suggest
that school officials are doing anything other than choosing among
values-embracing the good and rejecting the evil. If schools may
teach that racial discrimination and plagiarism are wrong, that re-
spect for human dignity and democratic processes is right, the an-
swer may lie less in our motives and more in our choice of values.
As Thomas Emerson observed, the system of freedom of expression
may be a product of constitutional law, but the "values and func-
tions which underlie it are essential to any open society."'1
3 1
129. See Library Book Selection, supra note 39, at 562-64.
130. Pico, 457 U.S. at 870 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967); see also Library Book Selection, supra note 39, at 562-63.
131. FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION, supra note 1, at 8.
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